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Abstract
We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when
participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which
potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process
is always more eﬃcient. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers.
Because the auction is more conducive to entry - precisely because of its ineﬃciency - it
usually generates higher expected revenue. We also discuss the eﬀects of lock-ups, matching
rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc.
JELs: D44 Auctions; G34 Mergers & Acquisitions; L13 Oligopoly & Imperfect Markets.
Keywords: Auctions, jump bidding, sequential sales, procurement, entry
Why do sellers like auctions? The simple answer is that auctions involve bidders com-
peting simultaneously, and this beneﬁts sellers.
But when entry is costly, auctions are ineﬃcient. Sequential mechanisms are more
eﬃcient, because later potential bidders can use the information from early bids in deciding
whether to undertake costly search and entry. If a seller can capture enough of the eﬃciency
gain from sequential entry, it is more proﬁtable for it to deal with just one bidder at a time,
letting the bidders respond to the potential competition from potential buyers, with the
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1entry costs for actual competition being incurred only when the early bidders turn out to
have low values.1
Nevertheless, any additional rents created by real-world sequential mechanisms – and
more – seemingly accrue to buyers: although some sellers of businesses, especially in the
"middle market", purposely choose to negotiate sequentially with one buyer at a time,2
about 80 percent of private equity ﬁrms in a recent poll said they prefer to use auctions
when acting as sellers. Meanwhile about 90 percent of the same ﬁrms said they preferred
to avoid auctions when acting as buyers.3 Warren Buﬀet famously states each year in
his annual report under “Acquisition Criteria”: “[W]e don’t want to waste our time ...We
don’t participate in auctions” (italics in original), and Bruce Wasserstein (2001), the most
successful U.S. mergers and acquisitions banker of the past 30 years, writes “A wide-ranging
auction generally maximizes value...sophisticated bidders will do their best to circumvent
the auction format.”
This paper therefore focuses on comparing the two dominant methods for selling public
companies - a simple “plain vanilla” simultaneous auction and an equally simple model of a
sequential sales mechanism - when the seller has realistically-limited power and information.4
(Similar alternative ways of selling are observed for many other assets.5)
In both processes we model, an unknown number of potential bidders make entry deci-
sions sequentially, before learning their values. In an auction, no credible bidding is possible
until all entry decisions have been taken. In a sequential mechanism, potential bidders arrive
in turn. Each one observes the current price and bidding history and decides whether to
pay the entry cost to learn its value. If it does, and if it succeeds in outbidding any current
incumbent (who can respond by raising its own bid), it can also make any additional "jump
bid" it wishes to attempt to deter further entry. In both processes, we assume the seller does
not have the power or credibility to commit to a take-it-or-leave-it minimum (reservation)
1Nihat Aktas, Eric de Bodt, and Richard Roll (2007) and Audra Boone and Harold Mulherin (2008)
emphasize the value of potential competition in obtaining a good oﬀer from a buyer.
2"Middle market" transactions are typically deﬁned as those between $50 million and $500 million. See
also Wasserstein (2001), and also see Boone and Mulherin (2007a,b) for a detailed breakdown of actual sales
methods.
3“Auction Process Roundtable”, Mergers and Acquisitions, December 2006, pp. 31-32.
Similarly, several large petrochemical companies are known for trying to maintain reputations for refusing
to enter auctions either for buying businesses or for supplying products, at the same time as they sell
businesses using auctions and procure supplies through "reverse" e-commerce auctions wherever possible.
4Wasserstein (2001) writes “It can be helpful to think of the range of possibilities in terms of two types
– the classic...auction and the negotiated sale.” In a negotiated sale a seller commonly agrees to a price
with a single bidder while retaining the right to talk subsequently to other bidders according to a “go shop”
agreement that gives it a limited amount of time to ﬁnd a better oﬀer; the agreement does not usually
permit the seller to subsidize a new bidder to compete, and the original bidder retains the right to beat any
new bidder’s oﬀers.
5O b v i o u se x a m p l e sa r eﬁne art and housing — see the conclusion.
2price above a buyer’s minimum possible value.
Our central result is that the straightforward, level-playing-ﬁeld competition that an auc-
tion creates is usually more proﬁtable for a seller than a sequential process, even though the
sequential mechanism is always more eﬃcient in expectation (as measured by the winner’s
expected value less expected aggregate entry costs). Bidders, by contrast, usually prefer to
subvert an auction by making pre-emptive "jump bids" when they can.
The sequential process is more eﬃcient because although it attracts fewer bidders in
expectation, it attracts more bidders when those bidders are most valuable - the existence
or absence of early bids informs subsequent entry decisions and attracts additional bidders
when the early ones turn out to be weak. But buyers’ ability to make pre-emptive jump
bids, which ineﬃciently deter too many potential rivals from entering, harms the seller.6
We identify four factors that may cause the expected revenue between the auction and
the sequential mechanism to diﬀer. The ﬁrst three all unambiguously favor the auction.
Two of these factors are fairly straightforward. First, even in the most favorable circum-
stances, a sequential process could only be superior if the queue of potential bidders is
suﬃciently much longer than the number that would compete in an auction. Second, in a
sequential mechanism bidders who deter entry choose a price where the expected distrib-
ution of winning values is such that an additional entrant would expect to earn zero. By
contrast, except in a knife-edge break-even case, bidders deterred from an auction face a
distribution of winning values that make entry strictly unproﬁtable.
These two factors would be nulliﬁed with an inﬁnite stream of potential bidders, and
when parameters are such that the expected proﬁts of the marginal bidder who does not
enter the auction is exactly zero. The third factor is therefore crucial: the value of the
winning bidder is generally less dispersed in the sequential process, because that process
is more likely to attract one high-value bidder but will never attract more than one. But
entrants prefer more dispersion in the value they have to beat, because dispersion makes
the entrant’s option to buy more valuable — this is just the standard consumer-theory result
that consumers prefer more random prices. Therefore, the expected value of the top bidder
in the auction must be higher than in the sequential mechanism to deter entry.
Thus, contrary to our usual instinct that auctions are proﬁtable because they are eﬃcient,
6Michael Fishman (1988) considered a model with two potential bidders, both of whom would have
participated in an auction. In this case, a pre-emptive oﬀer could deter entry by the second bidder but a
sequential mechanism would not increase the number of bidders.
David Hirshleifer and Ivan Png (1989), Kent Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998), and Robert Easley and Rafael
Tenorio (2004) emphasised jump bidding in the context of bidding costs (rather than costs of entry). Among
the large theoretical literature on endogenous entry into auctions, see McAfee and McMillan (1987), Ronald
Harstad (1990, 2003), McAfee, Dan Vincent, Mike Williams and Melanie Williams Havens (1993), Burguet
and Joszef Sakovics (1996), Menezes and Monteiro (2000), Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm (2001), and
the references therein.
3it is precisely the ineﬃciency of the auction - that entry into it is relatively ill-informed
and therefore leads to a more random outcome - that makes it more proﬁtable for the seller.
These three factors all speak to the superiority of the auction in generating entry, and
each factor provides a separate reason why the expected value of the winner in the auction
must exceed the expected value of the winner in the sequential mechanism. But the seller
ultimately cares about the expected price paid, and the comparison of expected prices is a
somewhat diﬀerent question. The fourth factor, then, involves the gap between expected
winning values and expected revenues, and this can work either for or against auctions.
However, we show that for typical demand speciﬁcations a higher expected winner’s
value directly implies higher expected revenue. More generally, we will see that the fourth
factor (whatever its sign) is only signiﬁcant when the third factor (which always favours the
auction) is large. So an auction is generally better for a seller.
Why do bidders capture more than 100 percent of the extra rents created by the sequen-
tial mechanism? We will see that pre-emptive bidding is crucial: jump-bidding allows buyers
to choose partial-pooling deterrence equilibria which over-deter entry relative to the social
optimum. Although the information that bidders signal makes the sequential mechanism
more eﬃcient than the auction, the over-deterrence transfers enough rents to the bidders
that sellers generally prefer auctions even when there is an inﬁnite stream of potential buy-
ers. With fewer potential buyers even eﬃcient signalling can hurt sellers, because there is
less potential to induce additional entry when early bidders are weak, so bidders earn some
scarcity rents in a sequential mechanism even when there are more of them than would enter
an auction.
With enough potential bidders, a sequential mechanism in which jump-bidding is pro-
hibited may be desirable from the seller’s viewpoint, because this retains the eﬃciency
advantages of a sequential process while curtailing over-deterrence. But in markets such as
that for corporate takeovers, it is generally the buyers who name prices, and pre-emptive
jump bids are common.
Our paper is not primarily about "optimal" mechanisms. Part of the appeal of the
auction is that the competition it creates allows the seller to do well independent of any
knowledge of bidder values or any ability to exploit that knowledge. In our model, if
the seller has enough information and commitment power to compute and charge optimal
entrance fees and subsidies, it can run an eﬃcient sequential procedure that extracts all
buyers’ surplus.7 More generally, if the seller can opportunistically subsidize entry it can
7See section VIIA. Our model (in which buyers have no information about their values before entering)
is similar to a special case of Jacques Cremer, Yossi Spiegel, and Charles Zheng (forthcoming), though
our model, unlike theirs, assumes the number of potential bidders is unknown. See also John Riley and
Richard Zeckhauser (1983), Preston McAfee and John McMillan (1987, 1988), Roberto Burguet (1996), Egil
Kjerstad and Steinar Vagstad (2000), Flavio Menezes and Paulo Monteiro (2000), Paul Milgrom (2004),
4increase expected revenue — mainly through the threat to subsidize. This both prompts
stronger types of current bidde r st om a k eh i g h e rd e t e r r i n go ﬀers, and prevents some of the
socially excessive deterrence — so in many cases subsidies never actually need to be paid.
But the sequential mechanism with subsidies can only be more proﬁtable than an auction
when the seller both has suﬃcient information and power to set the subsidies optimally and
has enough potential bidders. And if buyers can threaten to withdraw if the seller seeks
additional bids, the auction’s advantage increases — buyers who arrive in sequence and can
make credible take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers can extract all the surplus.
In sum, the auction looks more proﬁtable than practical versions of the sequential mech-
anism: absent extreme power on either side, sellers will generally prefer auctions and buyers
will generally prefer sequential mechanisms.
The eﬃciency implications of our model should be viewed with care. While the model
suggests the sequential mechanism is more eﬃcient than the auction, this may reﬂect the
model’s narrow view of eﬃciency. First, because the sequential mechanism gives more
surplus to the earliest bidders, potential entrants may dissipate their surplus in a race to
the front of the queue. In this case, net social surplus will equal seller revenue. And second,
even if bidders’ rents are not dissipated in this way, mechanisms that give sellers a greater
share of the value of the asset sold provide greater incentives to create valuable assets. So
since the auction usually raises more revenue, it may well be more socially eﬃcient overall.
We begin (in section I) with a model of a random number of symmetric risk-neutral
potential bidders with search costs of ﬁnding out their (private) values of, for example,
a company for sale.8 Section II solves for equilibrium behavior in the auction and in the
sequential mechanism. We show that auctions are less eﬃcient (section III) but likely to raise
more revenue (section IV) than sequential bidding, and explain why. While it is possible
to design examples where bidders prefer auctions, they typically prefer sequential processes
(section V).
Section VI shows our results are robust to simple modiﬁcations of our two basic sales
processes, although the sequential mechanism becomes more attractive to sellers if buyers
can be prevented from jump bidding. We also show that our results extend straightforwardly
to simple common-value settings. In section VII we consider how bidding subsidies and other
simple tactics such as lock-ups, break-up fees, and matching rights can be used by sellers to
improve their expected revenue from the sequential mechanism. Section VIII concludes.
and Cremer, Spiegel, and Zheng (2007) and for discussions of optimal mechanisms in related contexts. See
Paul Klemperer (1999, 2004), Vijay Krishna (2002), Milgrom (2004), and Menezes and Monteiro (2005) for
syntheses of a large fraction of the auction literature.
8Equivalently, symmetric risk-neutral potential suppliers can make costly investments which yield (pri-
vate) costs of selling to a procurer.
5IT h e M o d e l
We compare two mechanisms for selling an asset for which there is a queue of risk-neutral
potential buyers. The probability that at least j potential bidders exist, given the existence
of at least j − 1,i sρj, 0 ≤ ρj ≤ 1. We write {ρj}∞
j=1 for ρ1,ρ 2,ρ 3,... . Each buyer decides
in turn whether or not to pay a cost c to enter the sales mechanism. If it enters, it then
immediately learns its own private value, whichi sd r a w ni n d e p e n d e n t l y from the distribution
F(v) with a continuous density f(v). Without any loss of generality, assume F(v)=0 ,
F(v)=1 , v equals the seller’s value, and v 6 ∞. All this is common knowledge among the
buyers (the seller needs no knowledge of F(·),c ,or {ρj}∞
j=1).
In the Auction mechanism, players cannot make any credible bid commitments until
after entry stops. So when potential buyers make their entry decisions they observe only
how many bidders have entered thus far. When entry has stopped, there is a standard
English auction in which the bidder with the highest value wins and pays the value of the
second highest.
Our Sequential mechanism is one that is commonly assumed for the sale of a business
(see, e.g., Fishman (1988) and the subsequent literature based on his model). The ﬁrst
bidder simply chooses any initial bid. After any subsequent entry, the new entrant and
the incumbent high bidder compete by raising the price (possibly making jump bids) until
one or other quits; the surviver may then, if it wishes, make a further jump bid to deter
subsequent potential entrant(s) before ﬁnding out whether any actually exist. Since (we
will show9) all the equilibria of our game have identical outcomes and expected revenues,
we assume for simplicity that any new entry results in the price ﬁrst rising to the lower of
the new entant’s and the incumbent’s values, with any jump bid only occurring after the
lower-value of these bidders has quit. Bidders cannot lower bids that they have already
made. Potential entrants observe all previous bids before they make their entry decisions,
and when entry stops the current high bidder wins the asset at the price it bid.
We consider the perfect Nash equilibrium of the auction, which is unique except for
knife-edge cases with two equilibria when the last bidder is indiﬀerent to entering; in this
case we take the worse case (the last bidder does not enter) for the auction.
We also consider all the perfect Nash equilibria of the sequential mechanism in which
any buyer with a value greater than or equal to some constant cutoﬀ value v*m a k e sah i g h
enough pre-emptive bid that all subsequent entry is deterred.10 However, we focus most
attention on the unique perfect sequential equilibrium (as is standard in contexts like this
9See Remark 4.
10We will note later that there are other equilibria that are not (perfect) “symmetric cutoﬀ” equilibria,
but they do not seem very plausible.
6one — see below).11 We refer to the minimum value that deters entry in this equilibrium
of the sequential mechanism as VS. We will refer to the minimum value that would deter
entry, if it were known by all potential entrants to be the bidder’s value, as VK.12
To avoid trivialities, we assume there is at least one potential bidder and maybe more
(ρ1 =1and ρ2 > 0), and that c is suﬃciently small that at least two bidders would be
attracted into an auction if they exist. The seller can demand a minimum price of v in both
mechanisms but no higher. There is no discounting.
Notation
We write vi(k) for the actual ith highest value among k bidders, and n*f o rt h em a x i m u m
number of entrants into the auction. We write S(v) for the expected surplus of a bidder
who competes in an ascending auction against a second bidder, when their values are drawn
independently from F(·), conditional on the second bidder’s value exceeding v; and T(v) for
the expected surplus of the (ﬁrst) bidder, conditional on the second bidder’s value equalling
v. So T(v)=
R v




Finally, we write MR(v) ≡ [v −
1−F(v)
f(v) ]; using expected marginal revenues (EMRs),
together with the standard Facts 1 and 2 below, is not needed for our proofs, but assists
intuition and greatly simpliﬁes calculations.14
11In a perfect sequential equilibrium, no bidder wishes to deviate from the equilibrium if a potential
entrant who observes an out-of-equilibrium price would assume, if possible, that the bidder’s type is among
some set K (a subset of [v,v]) such that (i) all types in K would beneﬁtf r o mt h ed e v i a t i o nif it was then
inferred that the bidder’s type was in K, and (ii) all types not in K would prefer not to deviate given the
aforementioned inference.
This reﬁnement is also variously called “credible” or “neologism-proof” or “F-G-P” after its developers
(Sanford J. Grossman and Motty Perry (1986) and Joseph Farrell (1993)) — though Farrell’s deﬁnition is
very slightly diﬀerent, this is unimportant here; see also Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole’s (1991) standard
text. Technically, we use the natural extension of the reﬁnement to inﬁnite strategy spaces; also a bit more
than perfect sequential is needed to select a unique equilibrium when ρj =1∀j, and in that case we just use
the limit of the (unique) perfect sequential equilibria as ρj → 1 ∀j (this is also the unique equilibrium that
Farrell’s deﬁnition chooses ∀{ρj}∞
j=1,b e c a u s eh i sd e ﬁnition requires all types in K would strictly beneﬁti n
part (i) above).
12The "S"o fVS signiﬁes not only that it refers to the Sequential mechanism, but also that VS is this
mechanism’s revenue - or V alue to the Seller - in the important special case ρj =1∀j.T h e " K"o fVK
signiﬁes that it corresponds to bidders’ values being Known.
13Note that S(v) is not the surplus function that is often used in auction theory, i.e., it is not the surplus
of a bidder with value v. We never need to compute S(v) explicitly. It is also cumbersome to calculate
it directly. However, it is easily calculated using Fact 1 below as the diﬀerence between the value of the





f(x) ,a n dP1(x) is the probability with which the ﬁrst bidder wins conditional on
his value being x, that is,
F(x)−F(v)
1−F(v) for x ≥ v. So S(v)= 1
1−F(v)
R v
x=v[1 − F(x)][F(x) − F(v)]dx.
14Thus if one graphs a "demand curve" with v on the price axis, and 1−F(v) on the quantity axis, then
MR(v) is just the corresponding marginal revenue curve - a bidder whose value v is drawn from F(v) would
on average buy 1 − F(v) units at a take-it-or-leave-it price v, so has expected demand 1 − F(v).
We make no assumptions on the MR(v) function.
The mathematics of marginal revenue for auctions was introduced by Roger Myerson (1981); he coined the
7Fact 1 Consider any sales process that awards a good to one of a number of risk-neutral
bidders, each of whom must learn its own private value for the good if it wishes to enter the
bidding. Bidders’ values are independently drawn from a distribution F(v) w i t hac o n t i n u o u s
density f(v); F(v)=0 , F(v)=1 .I ft h em i n i m u mb i di sv, then the seller’s expected revenue
equals the EMR of the winning bidder.15
Fact 1 is the elementary extension of the standard Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Roger
Myerson (1981), Riley and William Samuelson (1981)) to a possibly random number of
bidders who must pay entry costs prior to bidding.16
Fact 2 For any value b v, conditional on a bidder’s value exceeding b v, the bidder’s EMR
equals b v.17
terms “virtual valuation” and “virtual utility” in Myerson (1984). Jeremy Bulow and John Roberts (1989)
ﬁrst used the nomenclature “marginal revenue”, and explained the connection with ordinary monopoly
theory. This connection, and "MR analysis", were extended to a broader set of assumptions by Bulow and
Klemperer (1996). MR analysis simpliﬁes the analysis in several ways.
First (when, as in our model, bidders’ signals are independent) bidtakers’ and bidders’ surpluses depend
only on the distribution of the winner’s value and not on prices, or on auction form, or on which bidders
actually participate: see Fact 1 and note 16.
Second, it is often easier to work with the winner’s marginal revenue than the price, since the price often
depends upon other bidders’ values, including in an ascending auction and in our sequential mechanism: see,
e.g., the discussion of factor (b) below Lemma 5. Doing so also often avoids performing multiple integrations
by parts: see, e.g., the calculations of bidders’ surpluses in notes 13 and 18, which both use the fact that
MR(x)f(x) has a particularly easy form.
Third, crucially, working with marginal revenues permits state-by-state dominance arguments that do
not apply to state-by-state revenues. This is exactly as in ordinary monopoly theory (because, of course,
the marginal revenue of an additional unit sold accounts for both the direct eﬀect on revenue (the price
paid) and the indirect eﬀect of the revenue lost from the lower price received for other units); in particular,
a monopolist can raise the contribution to proﬁts (price less cost) of some units by setting a higher or lower
price than the optimum, but it will weakly lower the contribution to marginal revenue less marginal cost of
every unit sold, since the optimum is set at MR= MC, so there is state-by-state dominance in MRs, but
not in prices. See, e.g., the discussion of Lemma 4. See Bulow and Klemperer (1996) for another application
to auction theory of state-by-state dominance in MRs where there is no dominance in prices or revenues.
15That is, the seller’s expected revenue equals
R v
v=vMR(v)P(v)dv,i nw h i c hP(v) is the probability density
with which a bidder with value v exists and wins the good. (So P(v)=
P
j ZjPj(v)f(v),i nw h i c hPj(v) is
the probability of potential bidder j being awarded the good conditional on it entering and its value being
v,a n dZj is the probability that potential buyer j both exists and enters — Zj is, of course, independent of
j’s value since it does not know it before entering.)
16It follows directly from the standard mathematics of revenue equivalence and marginal revenues, see
e.g., Klemperer (2004; pp. 40-41, 46-47). That is, in the notation of note 15, the incentive-compatibility
constraint implies that the expected post-entry surplus of any bidder, say j, who enters and learns its value
is v is
R v
x=vPj(x)dx (since if it ﬁnds its value is v it expects to earn zero surplus subsequent to entry) so its
expected payment to the seller is vPj(v) −
R v







x=vPj(x)dxdv which (integrating the second term by parts)
equals
R v
v=vMR(v)Pj(v)f(v)dv. Summing over all potential bidders times their probabilities of existing and






f(x) )f(x)dx = b v. This is mathematically equivalent to the fact that for a
monopolist the integral of marginal revenue equals price times quantity and so the average marginal revenue
of the buyers must equal the price.
8II Equilibria of the Mechanisms
A Equilibrium of the Auction
The auction treats all entrants symmetrically, independent of their order of entry, so it is
immediate that all of the ﬁrst n* potential bidders enter, if they exist, and there is no
subsequent entry, and
Lemma 1 The maximum number of entrants into the auction, n*, is the largest integer, n,
for which the expected surplus from being one of n bidders in the auction strictly exceeds c.18
We do not need to compute the expected revenue explicitly, but it is easy to do so:
it is the sum of expected revenue conditional on there being precisely j bidders times the
probability that precisely j bidders exist, for all j ∈ {1,2,...n*−1}, plus the expected
revenue when the maximum possible number of bidders, n*, enters times the probability
that at least n* potential bidders exist. So, using Fact 1 separately for each case



















Fact 1 also implies:
Remark 2 The Auction’s expected revenue would be unaﬀected if we assumed any other
standard auction, such as a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction.
B Equilibrium of the Sequential Mechanism
In the equilibrium of the sequential mechanism, the ﬁrst entrant makes a jump bid that
is high enough to deter subsequent entry if its value exceeds some cutoﬀ value, v*, and
otherwise bids the minimum price v — just as Fishman originally showed in his two-bidder
version of this model. Any subsequent entrant whose value exceeds the current high bid
competes with the current incumbent, and the price then rises until the lower-value of these
two bidders quits at the point at which the price reaches its value. If it was the current
incumbent who quit, the new entrant will then jump bid to the higher price that deters
18The winner’s value will be v1(n) and in our (English) auction the price will be v2(n), so per-bidder ex-
pected surplus equals 1
n(E{v1(n)}−E{v2(n)}). This is most easily computed using Fact 1 that the expected
auction revenue (E{v2(n)})e q u a l st h eEMR of the winner. Since the probability density of the highest
value among n is nf(x)Fn−1(x), per-bidder expected surplus = 1
n
R v
x=vnf(x)Fn−1(x){x − MR(x)}dx =
R v
x=v[1 − F(x)]Fn−1(x)dx.
9subsequent entry if its value exceeds the cutoﬀ value, v*, but will otherwise not raise the
price further prior to any further entry. (If it was the entrant that quit, there is also no
jump bid prior to further entry, in equilibrium, because the current incumbent’s value must
be below v*.) If there is no jump bid, another potential bidder then enters, if one exists.
The deterrence value, v* ,c a n n o tb el o w e rt h a nt h ev a l u eVS that satisﬁes S(VS)=c
(because if it were, a prospective entrant would proﬁt from entering against a deterring bid
- entering and winning would deter all future entry, and the gross surplus from competing
against an incumbent whose value is v*o rh i g h e ri sb yd e ﬁnition S(v*), and clearly S(v*) >c
if v*<V S). But an incumbent whose value is as low as VS can deter entry only if it is pooled
with types with higher values — if its value was known to be as low as VS, entry against it
would be known to be proﬁtable. So while v* = VS is a perfect Nash equilibrium, there are
other equilibria in which higher-value incumbents are separated.
The perfect constant-cutoﬀ Nash equilibrium in which the fewest types deter entry is the
one in which the only types who deter are those who would deter if their actual values were
known (namely those whose values at least equal the value VK which satisﬁes T(VK)=c).
In these equilibria a bidder with value VS ﬁnds it too costly to pool with higher-value
incumbents, and instead accommodates entry.19
However, as in Fishman’s model, only the v*= VS equilibrium is perfect sequential. In
other equilibria, bidders with values above VS could gain from deviating to a bid that signals
a value of (just) VS or more if (i) the potential entrant were then to infer the equilibrium
deterring value is actually only VS, and (ii) all other types of bidders would lose from making
such a bid however the potential entrant were to respond.20 The logic of perfect-sequential
equilibrium is that the potential entrant should make such an inference and a bid that
signals a value of at least VS therefore does deter entry. A large literature argues that the
unique perfect-sequential equilibrium is the only reasonable one in games like this one,21
19Equilibria with v* even higher than VK are ruled out by our assumption of a constant deterring value,
and also fail not only the intuitive criterion, but also the weaker “test of dominated messages”, even in any
single period - see proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix. (There is also a plethora of perfect non-constant-cutoﬀ
equilibria, but it is straightforward using MR analysis that the constant VK and constant VS equilibria
deﬁne the upper and lower bounds in expected revenue among all these that pass the "test of dominated
messages"; and there are even non-cutoﬀ equilibria, for example, entry could be deterred only by some
particular set of prices exceeding the price that would correspond to value VS, but these seem particularly
implausible.)
20In fact, a perfect sequential equilibrium requires only that all other types would lose from making such a
bid if the potential entrant makes the inference that they are types above VS (see note 11), so the reﬁnement
is (even) more compelling than usual in our context.
21Fishman (1988, 1989) restricts attention to this equilibrium in his two-potential-bidders version of
our model, contending that only this one is “credible”. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1986) claim
“The case for the minimum bid equilibrium is compelling.... There is no basis for [any alternative] belief,
since it is common knowledge that all types would like to [pay] the lowest possible price.” And Mark
Bagnoli, Roger Gordon, and Barton Lipman (1989) say “[We do not] clutter the text with details [of
equilibria that are not perfect sequential].” Other authors who take similar views and pays scant attention to
10and we therefore focus primarily on this, v*= VS, equilibrium.
At any time, the (lowest) bid that deters further entry (i.e. ,t h ed e t e r r i n gp r i c ea tt h a t
t i m e )i ss u c ht h a tab i d d e rw i t hv a l u ev* is just indiﬀerent about deviating to accommodating
entry. That is, the bidder with value v*i si n d i ﬀerent between making a deterring bid and
deviating to a strategy of never jump bidding but always bidding the lowest price possible
to beat any challenger until entry closes, or until the price exceeds v*.22 Summarizing (see
Appendix for the details of the proof, and for some simple examples):
Lemma 2 There exists a perfect Nash equilibrium of the Sequential mechanism in which
any buyer with a value greater than or equal to v* makes a bid that deters all subsequent
entry if and only if v*∈ [VS,VK]
where VS satisﬁes S(VS)=c, (1)
and VK satisﬁes T(VK)=c. (2)
In the unique perfect sequential equilibrium, v* = VS.
Example If F(v)=v for v ∈ [0,1] and ρ is constant (ρj = ρ ≤ 1 ∀j>1),a n yn e we n -







(>p ), after defeating the existing incumbent at price p.( F o rt h eﬁrst entrant, p = v (=0









ρ2 ln(1−ρv*).23 In the unique perfect
sequential equilibrium, v*= VS =1−
√
6c. (Calculations are in the Appendix.)
We do not need to compute expected revenue explicitly, but it is straightforward to
do so using MR analysis: because (Fact 1) the seller’s expected revenue equals the EMR
of the winner, we only need to know the distribution of the winner’s value. (Because the
deterring price generally changes over the course of the game - since it depends on the value
alternatives include Dan Bernhardt and David Scoones (1993), Kevin McCardle and S. Viswanathan (1994),
and Yeon-Koo Che and Tracy Lewis (forthcoming), among others. Riley’s (2001) authoritative survey of
the signalling literature makes a strong general argument for focusing on the perfect sequential equilibrium.
Finally, Andrew McLennan’s (1985) argument for “justiﬁable” equilibrium, and note 20, provide additional
arguments that this is the only natural equilibrium in our context.
A possible argument against the perfect sequential equilibrium is that the seller prefers the v*=
VK equilibrium, and could perhaps in eﬀect achieve it by slightly changing the game to one in which
the only reasonable equilibrium is v*= VK. We therefore discuss this possibility in section VII.
22If a bidder with value v* is just indiﬀerent about deviating, a bidder with a lower (higher) value would
strictly gain (lose) by deviating, since higher-value types prefer strategies with higher probabilities of winning
(and deviating strictly reduces the bidder’s probability of winning). Not deviating therefore signals a value
≥ v* and so successfully deters entry if v* ≥ VS.
23The deterring price is increasing in both p and ρ, and equals the deterring value, v*, both in the limit
as p → v* and in the limit as ρ → 1; as ρ → 0, the deterring price equals price, p; as ρ → 0 and 1, expected
revenue equals 0 and v*, respectively — see Remark 5.
11of the previous high bidder, and on the sequence of subsequent ρj’s - calculating revenue
by computing the actual price contingent on any sequence of bidders would be extremely
messy.):




















(The ﬁrst term sums (over j) the probability that the game will end with exactly j
bidders, all of whom have values less than v*, times the winner’s EMR conditional on this
event; this term may be negative. The second term is the probability that the winner’s
value exceeds v*, times v*, since (using Fact 2) the winner’s EMR equals v* conditional on
this event.)
Because Fact 1 means expected revenue depends only on the (expected) identity of the
winner, assumptions that aﬀect neither v* (and therefore also who enters) nor the fact that
the highest actual entrant wins, are unimportant. In particular:
Remark 4 Expected revenues (and each potential buyer’s expected surplus) would be unaf-
fected by bidders knowing the number of potential entrants who actually exist in advance of
any entry decisions (assuming it is common knowledge that they know this), and/or by the
timing of entrants’ jump-bidding (whether it is before, or during, or subsequent to competing
with a current incumbent, or at all of these times).24
When there are an inﬁnite number of potential bidders, the lowest deterring type must
bid its full value, v*, t od e t e r ,s i n c ei tm u s tb ei n d i ﬀerent about not deterring and if it did
not deter it would then surely face entry by someone with at least as high a value and so
earn zero surplus. So the deterring price always equals v* in this case, and therefore (as
can be conﬁrmed directly using Remark 3):
Remark 5 If ρj =1∀j, expected revenue = v*.
III Eﬃciency
It is a standard result that the amount of entry into a private-value ascending auction
is eﬃcient (see Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993)). So, since in both our mechanisms
the last potential entrant makes its entry decision based on the possibility of having to
24Actual prices depend upon these assumptions, of course. See the Example in the Appendix for an
illustration. For the result about buyers’ expected surpluses see note 16.
12compete in an ascending action with the strongest actual entrant, it is straightforward that
all the entry decisions are socially eﬃcient given the available information (details are in
the Appendix):
Lemma 3 Conditional on the information available to a potential entrant, it makes the
socially correct decision about whether to enter in either of the sales mechanisms.
Note that in the sequential mechanism the higher is v*, t h em o r ee ﬃcient is the equi-
librium. A social planner who could observe each bidder’s value upon entry would choose
entry until the highest value was such that the expected contribution of a new bidder was
less than or equal to zero, that is, until a bidder was found with a value greater than or
equal to VK,s i n c e
R v
x=VK[x − VK]f(x)dx − c = T(VK) − c =0 .S o t h e VK equilibrium is
socially optimal.
In other equilibria, entrants who ﬁnd out their values are in the range [v*,V K) pool with
those above VK and ineﬃciently prevent the further entry that would occur if their values
were publicly observed. However, all these equilibria are more eﬃcient than the auction,
because they all provide prospective bidders with better information than the auction does.
(A potential sequential bidder knows whether or not there is an incumbent bidder with a
value in excess of v*, and would never revise its entry decision if it were also told the number
of previous entrants; a potential auction bidder, by contrast, knows only the number of other
entrants, and might revise its decision if it were told whether or not there was an incumbent
with a value of more than v*.) Therefore, since all the entry decisions are socially eﬃcient
given the available information, the entry decision in the sequential mechanism is more
eﬃcient (in expectation) whenever the entry decisions in the two mechanisms diﬀer.25 Both
mechanisms select eﬃciently among all bidders who actually enter, so:
Proposition 1 The Sequential mechanism is more eﬃcient than the Auction.
Since when there is an inﬁnite number of potential bidders the deterring price always
equals v* (see the discussion leading to Remark 5), the expected proﬁt of any potential
entrant, conditional on there being no previous bidder above the cutoﬀ is T(v*) − c in this
case, and (2) then implies that bidders all earn zero expected proﬁts in the VK equilibrium.
So the VK equilibrium is not only eﬃcient but fully extractive in the “inﬁnite potential
bidder" case.
25Note when v*=VS a potential entrant is just indiﬀe r e n tt oe n t e r i n g ,a n ds oe n t r yi sam a t t e ro f
indiﬀerence for eﬃciency as well. However, the entry decision is then strictly more eﬃcient than in the
auction when bidders cease entering the auction even though none have yet bid VS.
13IV Revenue
The auction usually beats the sequential mechanism on revenue. We begin by showing
(details in the Appendix) that:
Lemma 4 For any given value of v*, if the auction is more proﬁtable in expectation than
the sequential mechanism for some sequence of {ρj}∞
j=1, then the auction is more proﬁtable
in expectation if any ρj is reduced.
This result is not obvious in terms of actual prices, because the auction is not necessarily
more proﬁtable ex-post, if the actual number of entrants turns out to be low. For example,
since the sequential mechanism encourages bidders to signal with high bids in early stages,
conditional on only one entrant actually existing ex-post, the sequential mechanism earns
more revenue than the auction (which then earns the minimum possible price). And, more
generally, even if the number of potential bidders actually existing is known in advance (and
is more than one), the sequential mechanism’s realised price m a yb eh i g h e ro rl o w e rt h a n
the auction’s.
However, the intuition is obvious using EMR’s (though we do not require EMR’s for
the proof). The reason is that conditional on n* or fewer bidders actually existing, the
auction always selects the highest-value bidder possible, so always achieves a higher EMR
than the sequential mechanism,26 while additional bidders beyond n*c l e a r l yh a v en oe ﬀect
on the auction but always (weakly) raise the sequential mechanism’s EMR.
We can now show that the auction is superior in expected revenue to the sequential
mechanism under likely conditions:
Proposition 2 The Auction is more proﬁtable in expectation than the Sequential mecha-
nism if (i) the equilibrium of the latter is its unique perfect sequential equilibrium and S(·)
is convex (as it is for economists’ most commonly used distributions of demand) and/or if
(ii)
Qn*+1
j=3 ρj is suﬃciently small (i.e., the probability of at least n*+1 potential entrants
existing, conditional on at least two existing, is suﬃciently small).
Proof : P a r t( i ) : b yL e m m a4 ,i ft h er e s u l th o l d sf o rρj =1∀j, it holds for all
{ρj}∞
j=1 ≤ 1. Also, S(VS)=c ≥ E{S(v2(n*))} ≥ S{E(v2(n*))}, in which the equality
is the entry condition for the sequential mechanism (equation (1)), the ﬁrst inequality is
the entry condition for the auction (an (n*+1)st potential entrant would not want to enter
26This does not rely on any assumption about MRs. Since the auction selects its highest-value entrant,
its EMR equals its expected second-highest entrant’s value (by Fact 2), which must in turn exceed the
expected MR of any bidder other than the auction winner, since v>MR (v),∀v<v.
14the auction given that it would compete against a bidder whose value exceeds the second-
highest of the n* previous entrants’ values, v2(n*)), and the second inequality is Jensen’s
inequality (if S(·) is convex). So, since S0(·) < 0,w eh a v eVS ≤ E(v2(n*)). Since if ρj =1∀j,
the expected revenue from the auction = E(v2(n*)), and the revenue from the sequential
mechanism = v* (see Remark 5),v *= VS suﬃces for the result.
Part (ii): recall from Remark 4 that the sequential mechanism’s (and the auction’s)
expected revenue would be unaﬀected if the actual number of potential entrants was revealed
to everyone prior to any entry decisions. So consider this case. Since the auction is strictly
more proﬁtable than the sequential mechanism in expectation when there are at least two,
but not more than n*, potential entrants (see note 26, or the proof of Lemma 4 - the
auction, but not the sequential mechanism, always sells to the highest-value potential entrant
in this event), this dominates the possibly-greater expected proﬁtability of the sequential
mechanism when there are more than n* potential entrants, if the relative probability of
the latter event is suﬃciently small. (When there is known to be just one potential entrant,
both sales methods earn v.) ¤
There are three reasons why the auction is usually strictly more proﬁtable than the
sequential mechanism. These correspond to the facts that each of the ﬁrst three inequali-
ties in the proof of part (i) (namely {ρj}∞
j=1 ≤ 1, c ≥ E{S(v2(n*))},a n dE{S(v2(n*))} ≥
S{E(v2(n*))}) are usually strict; they also correspond to the factors listed in the introduc-
tion.
First, there is never an inﬁnite stream of potential bidders in practice (i.e., ρj < 1, for
some27 j>2). Since the sequential mechanism only has an advantage when a long tail of
bidders actually enters, reducing the likely number of potential bidders reduces its chance
of beating the auction (recall Lemma 4).
Second, the jump-bids in the sequential mechanism are “ﬁne-tuned” to make entry just
barely unattractive to an additional bidder, while the expected proﬁt of the marginal bidder
who does not enter the auction is generally strictly negative (i.e., c>E {S(v2(n*))}).
Third, surplus from entry conditional on the value of the second-highest bidder is likely
to be convex (i.e., E{S(v2(n*))} >S {E(v2(n*))}). So since the value of the second-highest
bidder is random, its expected value (which equals the auction’s expected revenue) has to be
higher to deter entry than if this value were ﬁxed; by contrast, the sequential mechanism’s
cutoﬀ value (which determines the marginal entrant’s surplus from that mechanism) is ﬁxed.
Why does the auction’s randomness usually make it more proﬁtable?
27We need j>2 so that there is positive probability that at least 2, but not an inﬁnity of, potential
entrants exist (see the proofs of Proposition 2 part (ii) and Lemma 4).
15The reason the auction’s randomness usually makes it more proﬁtable, that is, the rea-
son S(v) is usually convex, is best understood by recognising that two separate factors
determine how the condition that the marginal prospective entrant be unwilling to enter
the mechanisms aﬀects the mechanisms’ relative proﬁtabilities. These factors are (a) the
standard consumer-theory result that the prospective entrant’s surplus if it were to enter
either mechanism would be convex in the value, v, of the bidder who wins assuming the
prospective entrant stays out (the prospective entrant can be thought of as having the
option to buy at the price v, which option becomes more valuable as the distribution of v
becomes more dispersed), i.e., T(v) is convex; and (b) the relationship between the values
of the winners of the mechanisms and the prices they pay.
Both factors (a) and (b) depend upon the fact that even if there were an inﬁnite number
of potential bidders, and the expected values of the winners of the two mechanisms were
the same, the dispersion of values faced by a new entrant into the auction would be greater
than the dispersion of values faced by a new entrant into the sequential mechanism. More
precisely:
Lemma 5 If the expected value of the winner of the auction with n ≥ 2 bidders equals that
of the winner of a sequential mechanism with cutoﬀ value v*a n da ni n ﬁnite number of
potential bidders, the distribution of the sequential-mechanism-winner’s value second-order
stochastically dominates that of the auction-winner’s value in the sense of Michael Rothschild
and Joseph Stiglitz (1970).
To understand this, see Figure 1 which pictures the case of uniform F(·).I nt h i sc a s e ,
the sequential-mechanism-winner’s value is drawn from a constant density truncated below
v*, while the auction-winner’s value is drawn from the increasing function Fn*(·).[ I N S E R T
FIGURE 1 HERE] So the truncated density must be the higher at v*, since both densities
integrate to 1. It must therefore also be the lower at v if both densities have the same
mean. So the densities cross just twice, and the truncated distribution is therefore less
risky. Considering a general F(·) simply distorts this picture without aﬀecting the “two-
crossings” property (see proof of Lemma in Appendix).28
Factor (a), then, is that, conditional on the two processes having the same expected
winning value, a new entrant would ﬁnd the auction more attractive because its distribution
of winning values is more dispersed. Equating the attractiveness of the two mechanisms
by increasing the expected value of the winner of the auction would require adding more
bidders, which would raise the expected second-highest value and so the expected revenue
28For intuition, observe that the sequential mechanism-winner’s value is drawn from F(·) truncated at
the ﬁxed value v*, while the auction-winner’s value can be thought of as drawn from F(·) truncated at the
random value v2(n*).
16in the auction. Alternatively, reducing the expected value of the winner of the sequential
mechanism would require reducing its cutoﬀ value, and therefore its expected revenue. So
factor (a) always favours the auction.
Factor (b) determines whether a greater dispersion of winning values leads to greater or
lower prices, conditional on any given expected winning value. Since the expected revenue
of any mechanism is the expected MR of the winning bidder, greater dispersion favours
(hurts) the auction if MR is convex (concave) in v. For demand functions commonly used
by economists, including linear, exponential, and constant elasticity, MR(v) is aﬃne,29 so
factor (b) is irrelevant. Furthermore, factor (b) can only matter much if winners have very
dispersed valuations. But more dispersed winners’ valuations also increase the importance
of factor (a) which unambiguously beneﬁts the auction.
In short, all four factors (the ﬁrst two inequalities of the proof of part (i) of proposition
2, and both the factors that determine the third inequality of the proof) go in the same
direction if MR(v) is convex, and this is therefore a very easily suﬃcient condition for
expected revenue to be greater in the auction than in the sequential mechanism.
A more formal way to understand why the auction’s randomness usually makes it more
proﬁtable is to use directly the microeconomic theory result that any consumer’s welfare
is always convex in the prices she faces. So T(v), the expected surplus of a bidder who
competes against another bidder with a value of exactly v, is always convex. Of course, the
auction’s relative proﬁtability depends upon the convexity of S(v), that is, the expected
surplus of a bidder who competes against another bidder with a value at least v. But since
S(v)=E{T(w) | w ≥ v} and v = E{MR(w) | w ≥ v} ( t h i si sF a c t2 ) ,w ec a ns h o wt h a t
S(v) is a convex transformation of v if T(v) is a convex transformation of MR(v), i.e., if
MR(v) is a convex transformation of −T(v). But because T(v) is convex, −T(v) is concave,
so it easily suﬃces that MR(v) is convex. That is (for proof see Appendix):
Lemma 6 S(v) is convex in v if MR(v) is convex in v.
Examples of relative proﬁtabilities of mechanisms
29For all these cases, the ratio of the slope of MR to the slope of (inverse) demand (v) is constant (i.e.,
d
2
dv2MR(v)=0everywhere): for uniformly-distributed signals (F(v)=
v−v
v−v), which generate linear demand,
the ratio of the slope of MR to the slope of demand = 1
2; for constant-elasticity distributed signals (F(v)=
1−(v
v)η,η<−1),t h er a t i o=
η
η+1; and for exponentially-distributed signals (F(v)=1−e−λ(v−v)), which
generate log-linear demand, the ratio =1 .
The condition d
2
dv2MR(v)=0is satisﬁed by any member of the generalised Pareto distribution.
Note that convexity of MR(v) in v (i.e., d2
dv2MR(v) ≥ 0) is not the same as convexity of the marginal
revenue curve as it is usually drawn (which corresponds to convexity in "quantity" (1 − F(v)), rather than
"price" (v)). MRconvexity is equivalent to concavity in the inverse hazard rate (or 2(h0(v))2 ≤ h(v)h00(v), in
which h(v) ≡
f(v)
1−F(v) = the hazard rate). It is not hard to show that if expected demand is convex (i.e.,
f0(·) ≤ 0), as u ﬃcient condition for S(·) to be convex is h0(·) ≥ 0.
17As an example, consider bidders with valuations uniformly distributed on [0,1],t h a t
is F(v)=v for v ∈ [0,1]. This corresponds to bidders forming a linear demand curve
p =1− q, in the limiting case where there are m such bidders each demanding 1/m units
at their values, as m →∞ . If c = .06, the auction would attract up to n*=3bidders and
yield expected revenue of .50 if there are at least three potential bidders. A fourth bidder
w o u l dh a v ea ne x p e c t e dl o s so fe x a c t l y.01 and so would not enter.
T oh a v et h es a m ee x p e c t e dw i n n e r ’ sv a l u e ,e v e nw i t ha ni n ﬁnite supply of potential
bidders, the sequential mechanism’s cutoﬀ, v*, would need to be .50 -s e eF i g u r e1 . But to
reduce a new entrant’s expected proﬁts to −.01, a bidder in the sequential mechanism would
have to credibly signal only that its value exceeded 1−
√
.3 ≈ .452 (because S(1−
√
.3) = .05,
so if c = .06 a new bidder would have an expected loss of .01 — the calculations for this
example are developed in detail in the Appendix). So roughly .50 − .45 = .05 of the extra
revenue of the auction over that from the sequential mechanism is attributable purely to
“convexity of surplus”: although the auction yields an expected winner’s value of .75, the
sequential mechanism only needs an expected winner’s value of .726 to reduce an entrant’s
net proﬁts to -.01, because its winner’s value is less dispersed. Because MR(v)=2 v−1,w i t h
MR neither concave nor convex, the diﬀerence in the expected value of the winner (here,
between .75 and .726) translates linearly into twice that diﬀerence in expected revenues.
If bidders pool on jump bids that make a new entrant’s expected proﬁts 0 instead of −.01,
then the cutoﬀ value is lowered to .40 (because S(.4) = .06 = c, so VS = .4),e x t e n d i n gt h e
auction’s advantage by another .05. Finally, if there were only three potential bidders (so
ρj =1for j ≤ 3 and zero otherwise), the “ﬁnite supply of bidders” reduces the sequential
mechanism’s expected revenue by .05 more, to about .35 while leaving the auction’s revenue
unchanged at .50.
Of course, by both choosing c so that an additional entrant is barely deterred in an
auction (so c = .05 here) and also choosing ρj =1∀j the last two eﬀects are nulliﬁed.
But even then, for the seller to prefer the sequential mechanism, the lower dispersion of the
sequential mechanism’s high value (worth the diﬀerence between .50 and .45 in the above
example) must be compensated by concavity in the MR function. However, MR concavity
only matters to the extent that the winning values in the auction and sequential mechanism
diﬀer. And the greater these diﬀerences, caused by the auction’s greater dispersion, the
greater the auction’s advantage in expected winning value must be, making it that much
harder for any concavity to help the sequential mechanism enough to catch up – even
ignoring the other two factors.
Nevertheless, it is possible to ﬁnd examples in which the sequential mechanism does
win — in particular by choosing a distribution with a marginal revenue function that is
essentially ﬂat at higher values (so that the higher expected winner’s value does little for
18the auction) and that conveniently becomes sharply lower just below VS (so that the auction
is disproportionately punished for low outcomes)30 – and then combining this with a large
stream of potential bidders and a carefully chosen c. For such an example, assume bidders
are equally likely to have the values 0, 8
11, and 1 (or a continuous approximation to this three
point distribution) and ρj =1∀j. The expected revenue from the sequential mechanism then
exceeds the expected revenue from the auction if (but only if) c ∈ ( 80
1782, 81
1782), in which case
c is low enough that VS = 8
11 and yet high enough that only 3 bidders enter the auction, so
the greater chance that revenue will be 0 in the auction matters more than the possibility
t h a tt h ea u c t i o n ’ sr e v e n u ew i l lb e1 . 31
If v*= VK the sequential mechanism is both socially optimal and fully extractive, as we
have seen in section III, and therefore it must beat the auction in expectation if (but only
if) the number of potential bidders is suﬃciently much greater than n*.
In short, there is a reasonable presumption that the expected price is higher in the
a u c t i o nt h a ni nt h es e q u e n t i a lm e c h a n i s m .
V Bidders’ Surplus
Since the seller’s proﬁts are usually higher in the auction, but social welfare is lower, bidders’
surplus must usually be lower also. We now show that not only does this result usually hold
for total bidders’ surplus, but that it is even more likely to hold for the surplus of the ﬁrst
bidder to enter. So the casual-empirical observation that the ﬁrst bidder will generally seek
to pre-empt an auction is borne out. We begin by showing (see Appendix for details):
Lemma 7 More bidders enter the Auction, in expectation, than the Sequential mechanism
if (i) the equilibrium of the latter is its unique perfect sequential equilibrium and/or if (ii)
Qn*+1
j=3 ρj is suﬃciently small.
The intuition is that the sequential mechanism sorts bidders better, in that entry stops
as soon as one bidder with a high enough value to deter future entrants is found, while
30The standard statistical distribution, F(v), that comes closest to these desiderata is the Normal distri-
bution, for which it is just barely possible for the sequential mechanism to win. But it can do so only if c ∈
(0.2821σ,0.2823σ) (in which σ is the standard deviation - we let v = −∞). Furthermore, the maximum
amount by which the sequential mechanism’s expected proﬁts can exceed the auction’s, for any values of the
parameters c, μ, σ, and {ρj}, is 0.001σ,w h e r e a si fc is just below .2821σ the auction’s expected revenue
is greater by over 500 times as much, even if ρj =1∀j. A more compelling example requires accentuating
the “hump” – as we do in the example below by inserting a large central atom.
31To calculate the continuous distribution analogue, note that a deterred entrant expects zero proﬁts from
entry if v*= VS, so a buyer with value 8
11 enters with probability 11c
1−11c. The expected value of the winner
in the auction, .892, comfortably exceeds the expected value of the winner in the sequential mechanism
(between .864 and .865 depending on c).
19the auction attracts a random number of high-value bidders and therefore on average needs
more bidders to achieve the same degree of entry deterrence. We now have (see Appendix):
Lemma 8 The ﬁrst bidder obtains a smaller fraction of the total bidder surplus, in expec-
tation, in the Auction than in the Sequential mechanism if (i) the equilibrium of the latter
is its unique perfect sequential equilibrium and/or if (ii)
Qn*+1
j=3 ρj is suﬃciently small.
The intuition is that not only are there more bidders on average among whom to split
the surplus in the auction (see the previous Lemma), but also the surplus is tilted towards
the ﬁrst bidder in the sequential mechanism, because that bidder sometimes deters others
in that mechanism, while all of the ﬁrst n* bidders always enter the auction if they exist.
It follows straightforwardly from these lemmas and Propositions 1 and 2 that:
Proposition 3 The Auction yields lower total bidder surplus, lower surplus per partici-
pating bidder, and lower surplus of the ﬁrst entrant, in expectation, than the Sequential
mechanism if (i) the equilibrium of the latter is its unique perfect sequential equilibrium,
and S(·) is convex and/or if (ii)
Qn*+1
j=3 ρj is suﬃciently small.
If both conditions (i) and (ii) fail, and the sequential mechanism has v*= VK when
ρj =1∀j, the auction is more attractive to all bidders. It is also possible to ﬁnd examples
in which all bidders prefer the auction with v*= VS when ρj =1∀j (and S(·) is not
convex), but parameters must be chosen very carefully — such examples are clearly even
more restricted than those for which the seller prefers the sequential mechanism.32
I ns h o r t ,b i d d e r s ,e s p e c i a l l yt h o s e“ a tt h ef r o n to ft h eq u e u e ”( w h oa r et h em o s ti n ﬂu-
ential), mostly prefer sequential mechanisms; our model supports the advice that bidders
should avoid auctions if possible.
VI Robustness
There are many variants of our simple canonical models of auctions and sequential sales
in reality. And which extensive form best represents any given real-world process is often
unclear. So how robust are our results?
32The example we gave in the previous section, for which the seller preferred the sequential mechanism,
is also one in which the auction is the most attractive mechanism for bidders in total surplus, surplus per
participating bidder, and surplus for the ﬁrst entrant. (If ρj =1∀j, the ﬁrst bidder’s expected surplus
is 28
297 − c and 27
297 − c in the auction and the sequential mechanism, respectively.) Of course, the set of
{ρj}∞
j=1 for which these statements hold is even smaller than the set for which the seller prefers the sequential
mechanism.
20AC o m m o n V a l u e s
We have focused upon an independent private value model. However, the simplest common
value version of our model gives essentially the same results:
To make things simple, assume exactly N potential bidders exist, that is, ρj =1for
j ≤ N; ρN+1 =0 . We maintain all the other assumptions of our original model, except
that we interpret the jth bidder’s draw from F(v) as its signal, not its value; instead, all
bidders share a common value which equals the sum of all N p o t e n t i a lb i d d e r s ’s i g n a l s .F o r
this subsection alone, we assume that the hazard rate f(v)/(1 − F(v)) is weakly increasing
in v.33 It is straightforward that in the symmetric equilibrium of an ascending auction
with n bidders the winner’s actual surplus equals the diﬀerence between the two highest
signals, so the entry condition for the auction, and the computation of n*, is exactly as
before. Furthermore (1), that is, S(v*)=c,d e ﬁnes a perfect sequential equilibrium of the
sequential mechanism, as before, if c is not too large.34 The equilibrium parallels that of the
independent private value case; as before, deterring bids are determined so that a bidder
with signal v*i si n d i ﬀerent between deterring and not deterring.
So it is easy to see that our result about proﬁtability (Proposition 2) holds exactly as
before. Furthermore, all that matters for eﬃciency is the expected number of bidders, so
L e m m a7s u ﬃces for the result that the sequential mechanism is the more eﬃcient sales
process (Proposition 1), and our result about bidders’ preferences (Proposition 3) also fol-
lows.
Calculation of equilibrium (and our results) remains straightforward when there is a
random number of bidders in a “sum-of-signals” model, so long as the existence of an
additional bidder always weakly increases the expected value of the asset, regardless of the
bidder’s signal. This would be true if, for example, the common value was the sum of the
signals of all those potential bidders who exist and either v ≥ ρjE(v) ∀j, or ρj is (weakly)
increasing and v ≥ 0. (If a new entrant appearing and paying for a signal could reduce the
asset’s expected value, the entrant might be unwilling to top the current bid even if it’s
signal exceeded the incumbent’s; so the sequential mechanism’s winner might not be the
bidder with the highest signal, and the incumbent’s signal would no longer be a suﬃcient
statistic for determining whether further entry would be deterred.)
33Bulow and Klemperer (2002) explain the importance of this assumption in common-value models, and
provide additional information about their solution.
34We require that S(v*)=c yields v*≥ E(v). Otherwise, there are complications akin to those for
ρj ∈ (0,1) that we discuss later in this subsection.
21B Simultaneous (Random) Entry into the Auction
No important result is aﬀected if potential bidders make simultaneous, instead of sequential,
entry decisions into the auction. This is true whether we assume as in, e.g., Dan Levin
and James L. Smith (1994), that potential bidders know the actual number of potential
entrants when they make their entry decisions, or we assume potential bidders only know
the distribution of the number of other potential entrants when they make their decisions.
The logic of Proposition 2 holds exactly as before: because the second-highest value in the
a u c t i o ni sr a n d o m ,t h ea u c t i o np r i c em u s tb eh igher than the sequential mechanism’s price
to deter entry, if S(·) is convex.35 And since the random-entry auction is less eﬃcient than
the auction of our basic model (bidders have less information when they make their entry
decisions), the auction remains less eﬃcient than the sequential mechanism (Proposition 1),
and Proposition 3 also follows.
C Soft-closing Auctions
A seller may lack the ability or desire to commit to closing an auction if none of the initial
entrants bids high enough. Assuming they have the ability to jump bid prior to any further
entry, then if none of the initial bidders signals a value of at least v*, an additional bidder
or group of bidders (if any exist) will enter in a second round, and so on, until either there
are no more potential entrants, or at least one bidder has a value exceeding v*a n do ﬀers a
deterring price.
It is easy to check that the expected revenue from such a "soft-closing" auction may be
either higher or lower than in our basic auction, depending on parameters.36 Furthermore,
this auction is always weakly more proﬁtable and less eﬃcient, in expectation, than the
sequential mechanism: when only one bidder enters the "soft-closing" auction at a time,
the mechanisms are identical, and when more than one bidder enters at a time, the auction
has lower eﬃciency, but higher expected revenue, because it will attract at least as many if
not more bidders than the sequential mechanism, and it may attract more than one bidder
with a value in excess of VS.37
35The proof is essentially unchanged if we simply replace v2(n*) by the actual second-highest value of
whatever (random) number of bidders actually enter. The random-entry auction may be either more or
less proﬁtable than the auction of our basic model. David Reiley (2005) shows internet auctions are better
modeled by random than by deterministic entry.
36For example, assume that there are an inﬁnite number of potential bidders, each with values uniform on
[0,1]. Let c be close to 2/27. Then the basic auction will attract three bidders and have expected revenue of
1/2. The sequential mechanism would yield VS =1 /3. If c is just over 2/27, the hybrid auction will attract
t w ob i d d e r sa tat i m eu n t i la tl e a s to n ei sw i l l i n gt op a y1/3 or more, and expected revenue is 4/9. If c is
just under 2/27 the hybrid auction will attract three bidders at a time until at least one is willing to pay
1/3 or more and expected revenue is 7/13.
37The mechanisms yield diﬀerent prices only when more than one bidder enters simultaneously in the last
22D Sequential Mechanisms Without Jump Bidding
One assumption that does importantly aﬀect our proﬁtability comparisons is that entrants
into the sequential mechanism can make jump bids to scare oﬀ subsequent entry.
The assumption is unimportant for eﬃciency. The greater expected eﬃciency of the
sequential mechanism relative to the auction is due entirely to the information revealed by
bidders competing until there is a single survivor prior to any further entry; the extra infor-
mation prospective entrants learn by observing pre-emptive jump bids (or their absence),
contributes nothing additional:
Proposition 4 The expected eﬃciency of the unique perfect sequential equilibrium of the
Sequential mechanism would be unaﬀected if jump bids were not possible.
Proof : Absent jump bidding, potential entrants’ information about the incumbent’s value
is only that it exceeds the value of the second-highest-value entrant to date, which the
competition between the bidders allows it to observe. So entry will continue after the entry
of the ﬁrst bidder with a value above VS. However, entry that takes place while there is
just one bidder whose value exceeds VS is on average neutral for eﬃciency, since revealing
only that the incumbent’s value exceeds VS would leave potential entrants indiﬀerent about
entering, and potential entrants make the socially correct decisions given their information
- see Lemma 3. Conditional on there having been two entrants whose values exceed VS,
so that the higher of these two bidders’ values must be drawn from a distribution of F(·)
truncated somewhere above VS, further entry is socially undesirable. But as soon as two
such bidders have entered, the price will anyway be driven up to VS or higher, thus deterring
all further entry even without jump bidding.¤
But although jump bids are unimportant for total surplus, they play a crucial role in
transferring it from the sellers to the buyers. When there are no rents to be earned from
bidder scarcity (ρj =1∀j) bidder proﬁts are entirely due to the ability to make jump
bids: absent jump bidding, a potential entrant knows only that the current incumbent’s
value exceeds the actual value of the second-highest-value entrant to date. So entry will
continue until the value of the second-highest-value entrant is at least VS, at which point
round of the auction. Since no bidders prior to this round have values exceeding VS, the logic of Step 1 of
the proof of Lemma 4 applies to this group of bidders. (As usual, the sequential mechanism’s price in some
states exceeds the auction’s price. Also as usual, Facts 1 and 2 provide a quicker proof: the mechanisms
have diﬀerent winners only when at least two auction entrants’ values exceed VS. The auction winner’s value
then exceeds at least one other value above VS, so its EMR exceeds VS, while the sequential mechanism’s
winner’s EMR equals VS in this case. So the auction wins.)
Another possible assumption is that bidders in the soft-closing auction cannot jump-bid prior to further
entry. In this case, too, the new procedure may be more or less proﬁtable in expectation than the basic
auction, but is always more proﬁtable in expectation than the (basic) sequential mechanism.
23the competition between the two highest-value entrants will demonstrate that at least one
h a sav a l u ea b o v eVS, and there will be no subsequent entry.38 So, with an inﬁnite supply of
potential entrants, each new entrant knows it will win only if and when it beats one bidder
whose value exceeds VS. So it expects to earn zero proﬁts (by equation (1)), that is:
Proposition 5 If jump bids were not possible in the Sequential mechanism, and there is an
inﬁnite supply of potential entrants, all bidders would earn zero surplus.
Because the “no jump bidding” mechanism would be both fully extractive (when ρj =
1 ∀j)a n da se ﬃcient as the perfect sequential equilibrium of our basic sequential mechanism,
w h i c hi si nt u r nm o r ee ﬃcient than the auction, it must yield higher expected revenue than
the auction in this case. (Of course, the auction remains more proﬁtable if suﬃciently few
potential entrants are expected — Part (ii) of Proposition 2 holds exactly as before.)
The reason jump bidding is so proﬁtable for buyers is that it allows them to partially
pool; many buyers who would not be able to deter entry if their values were known are able
to do so by pooling with higher-value buyers. The perfect sequential equilibrium maximizes
the size of the pool. By doing so, it also minimizes the cost of signaling to those bidders
who would anyway be able to deter. From the seller’s viewpoint, the cost of this strategic
signalling outweighs the eﬃciency advantages of the sequential mechanism.
Observe that a special case of our model is equivalent to one in which all potential
purchasers are initially present, if F(·) has suﬃcient dispersion that no one will ever bid
without ﬁrst paying the cost, c, to learn its value, and if the "auction mechanism" (but
not the sequential mechanism) prohibits any learning of values after the bidding has begun.
So our results here closely parallel those of Olivier Compte and Philippe Jehiel (2007) who
model a ﬁxed number of bidders, some of whom know their values for an object, while others
are initially uninformed. They ﬁnd that if there are suﬃciently many bidders, then allowing
uninformed bidders to purchase information about their actual values during a continuous
ascending auction is more proﬁtable than permitting them to buy such information only
prior to the auction - in other words, in this context in which jump bids are not permitted,
a "sequential" process is more proﬁtable than a simultaneous auction. Leonardo Rezende
(2005) and Eric Rasmusen (2006) obtain similar results.
So if the number of potential entrants is suﬃciently large, running a sequential process
a tt h es a m et i m ea sp r o h i b i t i n gj u m pb i d d i n gm i g h tb eas e l l e r ’ sb e s to p t i o n-i ft h i si s
practical to implement.
38The expected number of entrants in the sequential mechanism without jump bids is therefore twice
what it would be if jump bidding were possible (if ρj =1∀j).
24E Buyers’ Bargaining Power
Buyers may be able to improve their position, and reduce expected revenues in the sequential
mechanism, if they can build a reputation for exiting if an oﬀer they make is not accepted. In
the extreme case where sequential buyers can all fully commit to making take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers, and ρj =0for at least one (perhaps large) j, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium
is for the ﬁr s tb i d d e rt om a k ea no ﬀer of v with the seller accepting. (The game is trivial to
solve recursively.) This mechanism obviously minimizes seller surplus and, if v − MR(v) is
weakly decreasing in v (that is, the hazard rate f(v)/(1 − F(v)) is weakly increasing in v),
maximizes buyers’ expected surplus.39
The more general principle is that if there is a high enough chance that a buyer will
leave, then the seller may be forced to accept a price that would not deter future bidders,
because of the risk of losing the current bidder. The increase in buyer’s surplus from the
lower price plus the eﬃciency loss from reduced entry causes a double hit to the seller.
If it is easier to credibly threaten to withdraw if a seller pursues new entrants in a
sequential mechanism than to withdraw in the middle of bidding in an auction, this is
another reason for sellers to prefer auctions.
F Other Assumptions
Remarks 2 and 4 illustrate that several assumptions about the extensive forms of the mecha-
nisms are unimportant. Of course, other assumptions might matter more.40 But the bottom
line is that varying our assumptions seems more likely to reinforce our results than to un-
dermine them. The main caveat is that if the seller has the power to prevent jump bidding,
and there are likely to be many bidders, the sequential mechanism looks very attractive to
39If v−MR(v) is increasing in v, bidders who cannot resell may, for example, depending on bidding costs,
do better in expectation, in aggregate, if the seller sets a reserve price above v.
40For example, we have not considered (ex-ante) asymmetries among bidders. Both simple ascending
auctions, and simple sequential procedures can perform very badly in this context. A ﬁrst-price auction (or
an Anglo-Dutch auction, see Klemperer (2002)) may perform better, but the premium on the seller having
the power to implement more complex procedures may be large.
Also important is that a simple auction is perhaps more easily undermined, than a sequential process, by
collusion, but the "soft closing" auction may mitigate this problem. (McAfee et al (1993) discusses collusion
in a two-bidder version of our sequential mechanism.)
For the sale of corporate assets a preference for speed, discretion, or a long-term buyer (such as Buﬀett),
or a ﬁnancial buyer likely to retain current management, or a management buyout (where the management
will prefer a low sales price) can make a sequential process preferable to some sellers.
Our model also ignores bidding costs (in Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998)’s early work on sequential models of
takeovers (without entry costs) these make a simultaneous auction more eﬃcient, as well as more proﬁtable,
than a sequential process), any other technological costs of choosing one selling mechanism over another
(see, e.g., Ruqu Wang (1993, 1995, 1998) and Michael Arnold and Steven Lippman (1995)); legal issues (see,
e.g., Peter Cramton and Alan Schwartz (1991), Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black (1995)); seller credibility
(see, e.g., Guiseppe Lopomo (2000), David McAdams and Michael Schwarz (2007)); etc.
25it. On the other hand, if buyers have any countervailing power — in particular, the ability to
credibly withdraw if additional buyers are sought — then the auction is especially attractive
to sellers.
VII Promoting Entry
Sequential sales perform poorly for sellers, despite their relative eﬃciency, because auctions
attract more entrants when they matter most. We now explore whether, or when, tactics to
promote entry can enable sellers to capture greater revenues from a sequential mechanism.
AC a s h S u b s i d i e s
If the seller knows F(·),c, and {ρj}∞
j=1 and can pre-commit to a set of rules and the full
common knowledge assumptions obtain for buyers, it can assure eﬃcient entry and extract
all surplus by using a sequence of entry fees and subsidies that give the buyers no expected
surplus.41 This seems unrealistic. But it is natural to ask whether there is any simpler
modiﬁcation of the basic sequential mechanism that yields an outcome corresponding to the
seller’s “favorite” equilibrium (v*= VK), while satisfying the perfect sequential equilibrium
reﬁnement that is usually imposed?
The answer is “yes”, provided the seller also knows F(·),c,and {ρj}∞
j=1. If the seller has
the ability to partially subsidize (but not tax) new entry, this raises the signal (and therefore
the price) needed to deter entry. In particular, if the size of the possible subsidy is chosen
correctly, incumbent bidders with values between VS and VK are prevented from being able
to pool with those above VK. Even better, when the weaker types are separated from the
stronger ones an unsubsidized entrant will compete against them. So while the threat of the
subsidy is necessary, the subsidy never actually needs to be paid! The outcome is therefore
exactly the same as the VK equilibrium we discussed earlier, and is therefore more proﬁtable
than the auction for ρj =1∀j.T h a ti s ,
41The simplest eﬃcient mechanism commits to a sequence of reserve prices for successive buyers, chosen
so that any buyer with value VK is just willing to pay its reserve price rather than face additional entry. If
entry ceases, a simple ascending auction is held between all those who have entered. To make the mechanism
fully-extractive requires charging each successive entrant an entrance fee equal to his expected surplus from
entry. See section 3.3 of Cremer, Spiegel, and Zheng (forthcoming), who also show that fully extractive
eﬃcient mechanisms can be implemented in considerably more general models than ours. (Cremer, Spiegel,
and Zheng also generalise to allow for time discounting, so it can be eﬃcient to have multiple entrants
simultaneously, and generalise to bidders with diﬀerent entry costs and with values drawn from diﬀerent
and non-independent distributions, so the optimal mechanism of an all-powerful buyer is then considerably
more complex.)
If the seller can commit to subsidise future entrants, it can extract all surplus without needing to set
reserve prices, as we now show.
26Proposition 6 Consider the Sequential mechanism with the additional feature that after
any buyer enters and bids, the seller has the ability but not the obligation to oﬀer to subsidise
up to c−S(VK) of the next potential entrant’s cost of ﬁnding out its value. The unique
perfect sequential equilibrium of this mechanism is more proﬁtable in expectation than the
Auction for a set of sequences of {ρj}∞
j=1 that includes ρj =1∀j. Buyers with values below
VK cannot deter entry, but no subsidies are paid in equilibrium.
Proof : If, when the current high bid is p, as i n g l eﬁnal buyer enters, the joint beneﬁt
to the new bidder and the seller is vj − p if vj >p ,and 0 otherwise, where vj is the new
bidder’s actual value, regardless of whether the incumbent outbids the entrant. So from (2)
the seller would like to induce (at least) one additional entrant if p<V K. Therefore, since
the seller can if it wishes subsidise any potential bidder so that that bidder’s total entry
costs are no more than S(VK), a price below VK would only deter entry if it signalled that
the deterring incumbent’s value was at least VK. Obviously, no bidder with a value below
VK will be willing to set a price above VK, so it follows that no bidder with a value below
VK will deter entry.
As in Lemma 2, in the unique perfect sequential equilibrium, the pool of deterring bidders
is as large as possible, so all those with values above VK will deter. Clearly no subsidy is then
required to induce entry if the potential entrant faces only bidders who have not deterred
(since an unsubsidized entrant earns at least zero in expectation if it will be able to buy at
a price no more than VK), and no feasible subsidy will induce entry once a deterring bid has
been made. Therefore, no subsidies are actually paid in this equilibrium.
Furthermore, the discussion at the end of section III then implies the equilibrium is both
eﬃcient and fully extractive when ρj =1∀j, and so more proﬁtable than the auction in this
case.¤
Clearly the modiﬁed sequential mechanism will be more proﬁtable than the auction for
sequences of {ρj}∞
j=1 that are “close enough” to ρj =1∀j, but the argument of Proposition
2p a r t( i i )s h o w st h a tf o r“ s u ﬃciently small” {ρj}∞
j=1 the auction remains more proﬁtable.42
42Another way to encourage entry is to prohibit incumbent bidders from raising their bids in response to
it. Entry will then continue until the price VK is bid. If ρj =1∀j, this is socially eﬃcient and leaves no
expected surplus for bidders, so achieves the maximum expected revenue obtainable from any mechanism.
Aaron Edlin (2002) discusses regulatory regimes based on this principle. However, it may be hard to credibly
commit to sticking to this strategy. It is also dangerous if there are likely to be few potential entrants: in
this case, the fact that such a high price (VK) is required to deter entry means bidders may instead gamble
on low-ball bids being enough to win.
This subsection’s result that the modiﬁed sequential mechanism is more proﬁt a b l ei ne x p e c t a t i o nt h a n
the auction for a set of {ρj}∞
j=1 that includes ρj =1∀j, applies to any perfect Nash equilibrium, not just
to the unique perfect sequential equilibrium.
27B Lock-ups, Break-up Fees, and Matching Rights
The previous subsection shows that entry subsidies can make the sequential mechanism
both more eﬃcient and more proﬁtable than the auction. By making entry subsidies larger
still, the sequential mechanism can often be made even more proﬁtable, by further raising
the signal required to deter entry.
However, if the seller has the ability to oﬀer larger subsidies than c−S(VK),t h e ns u b s i -
dies must sometimes actually be paid — even in circumstances in which a subsidy would not
have had to be paid if large subsidies were not possible — because bidders who fear future
high subsidies to attract entry against them may need to be paid to be persuaded to enter
today.43 Furthermore, the gains to the seller from reducing buyer surplus are reduced by
the ineﬃciency of the incremental entry induced by these larger subsidies.
The seller could do better than simply oﬀering large subsidies if it could pre-commit to
avoiding future ineﬃcient subsidies. In particular, it could beneﬁt from a provision that
prohibited it from paying any further subsidies to additional bidders if the current entrant
signalled a value of at least VK.
Such a combination of a subsidy to a current entrant and a promise to limit future
subsidies parallels the common practice of sellers of public companies of oﬀering “lock-ups”
that include a break-up fee (equivalent to cash paid out of corporate assets) and “matching
rights” that prohibit subsidies to future bidders in return for a suﬃciently high bid.44
So our analysis suggests a role for lock-up-like combinations of current subsidies and
promises about future subsidies, but the details will depend not only on the bargaining
power of the seller against any new entrant, but also on the speciﬁcation of the bargaining
protocol between the seller and the current incumbent (since bargaining between these actors
c a nl e a dt oe v e nm o r ee ﬃcient outcomes). This is beyond the scope of the current paper.
However, we are sceptical of the broad use of subsidies in practice. Subsidies can easily
be abused by a seller who wishes to bias the process. It is not uncommon to see the board
43In particular, when large subsidies are feasible a ﬁrst bidder with a value above VK may prefer to make
the minimum allowable bid and risk entry if ρ2 is small, rather than bid VK to deter entry (because a lower
bid that simply signals a value of VK may not — by contrast with the low-subsidy case — be enough to deter
entry); the second bidder may then require a subsidy since it may have to face future highly-subsidized entry
(it will certainly require a subsidy if ρj =1∀ j>2). The need to sometimes actually pay a subsidy means
that in some examples the ability to oﬀer subsidies above c−S(VK) does not help the seller in expectation.
44A break-up fee guarantees the bidder a ﬁxed sum in return for making its oﬀer, payable if the deal fails
to be completed — typically because of a topping oﬀer by another bidder — and are typically accompanied
by “matching rights”. Since the break-up fee is a sunk cost once agreed to, it only distorts an auction if the
recipient makes an initial oﬀer above its value in order to receive it. See Ian Ayres (1990). Che and Lewis
(2007) show the merits of breakup fees in Fishman (1988)’s model. (Sometimes buyers will oﬀer sellers
break-up fees, for example, as protection against a deal collapsing because of antitrust problems. Break-up
fees are limited to 1% of the value of the bid in the UK, but can be much higher in the US.) Related issues
are discussed by Michael Rothkopf, Harstad and Yuhong Fu (2003).
28of a target company granting subsidies (with matching rights) to an initial bidder that has
made a deal with management, eﬀectively deterring other bidders.45 And potential ﬁrst
bidders may be deterred by the possibility of the board paying subsidies to a management-
led counter-bid or other favored alternative bidder.46
Even putting aside both this moral hazard problem, and the problem of attracting non-
genuine bidders who pocket subsidies without investigating serious bids,47 the tactics con-
sidered here depend sensitively on the seller’s information. The basic sequential mechanism
and the auction can be implemented by a seller who knows nothing about the distribution
of bidders’ values, or bidders’ perception of that distribution, or their cost of entry. But
the tactics here require knowledge of all these things. And with endogenous entry the im-
plementation of an “optimal mechanism” is fraught with danger: there is a small diﬀerence
between a tactic that extracts all surplus and one that discourages all entry. So while the
ability to oﬀer a limited special deal to a “white knight” involving paying its fees, or giving
it cheap options or a lock-up, can increase expected revenue, this depends upon the seller
being a revenue-maximiser with suﬃcient informational resources48 and commitment powers
to ﬁne—tune its use of these tactics.
In addition, of course, even with modiﬁcations, the sequential mechanism beats the
auction only if there are “enough” potential bidders. All told, there is good justiﬁcation for
the U.S. legal system’s strong encouragement of auctions for the sale of public companies
(see Cramton and Schwartz (1991)).
45Paying break-up fees to initial bidders is especially suspect. Consider, for example, the recent $33 billion
buyout of hospital owner HCA, which gave the group that included management a $300 million break-up
fee and matching rights in return for an oﬀer that exceeded the pre-takeover valuation by about $3 billion.
Since the management group was probably also better informed than any potential rival, it is no surprise
that investment bankers were then unable to ﬁnd a competing oﬀer.
46For example, if ρj =1∀j and the ﬁrst potential bidder perceives any risk that future subsidies will
be larger than optimal, it will never enter, since it would be forced to either bid above VK or to suﬀer
subsidised competition.
A further concern arises if management can pay subsidies in shares. Giving shares is cheaper than paying
cash, because the recipient values them more than the seller — either the recipient sells out at the sale price
that would have resulted anyway, or the recipient is the ﬁnal winner and so values them more than this,
and because it gives the recipient a toe-hold advantage (see Bulow, Ming Huang and Klemperer (1999)).
So management has a temptation to oﬀer a subsidy in shares even against a bid of VK — but no bidder will
then be prepared to make an original bid of VK.
47Giving break-up fees and matching rights only in return for a “good” oﬀer mitigate the second problem
but without eliminating it (it is usually not hard for a winner to ﬁnd an excuse to withdraw) and at the
cost of possibly introducing ineﬃciency (see note 44).
48But if the seller is thought to have too much information, for example, more information than the bidders
about the probability of further potential entrants, then the current potential bidder may be reluctant to
deal with the seller.
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Much academic and practitioner opinion argues that sellers beneﬁt from the “level playing
ﬁeld” competition of a simultaneous auction. For example, Bulow and Klemperer (1996)
show under mild conditions that even a simple ascending auction with no reserve price is
more proﬁtable than the best possible process that can be conducted with one fewer bidder.
But models such as this assume no entry costs, so an auction is also most eﬃcient. If
participating in the sales process is costly, the case for auctions is less compelling, because
sequential mechanisms are more eﬃcient.
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, auctions generally work best for sellers. As a weapon
for negotiating a price, the threat of refusing an oﬀer and waiting for more competitors is
less eﬀective than actually inviting the competitors straight in - even though the latter
strategy is more socially costly. Buyers, on the other hand, usually gain (in expectation) by
disrupting an auction process and forcing sellers to deal with them sequentially. Why?
The auction has three clear advantages for the seller: ﬁrst, it requires only a limited
number of potential bidders to achieve its maximum expected revenue; the sequential mech-
anism’s advantage in being able to consider more buyers if earlier oﬀers are too low is only
relevant if the number of potential bidders exceeds the number that would participate in
an auction. Second, buyers in a sequential mechanism can make jump bids that just deter
entry and so increase their expected proﬁts at the the seller’s expense. Third, the greater
dispersion in the winner’s value in the auction means its expected value must also be higher
— and although it does not follow that the price it pays is necessarily higher, the greater
entry means it usually will be.
So sellers only rarely beneﬁtf r o mt h ee ﬃciencies created by sequential search.
The main exception is that if it is diﬃcult for buyers to make credible public jump bids,
a simple sequential mechanism may be more proﬁtable than an auction if there are also
suﬃciently many potential buyers and the buyers have suﬃciently high costs of collecting
enough information to bid. This might help explain why sequential sales procedures are
common for residential housing, where search costs, inspection fees, etc., may be high and
where (in many jurisdictions) it is hard to commit to a ﬁrm oﬀer. For more valuable
properties and commercial real estate, search costs are a smaller fraction of values, the
number of bidders may be smaller, and their abilities to make credible bids may be greater
— consistent with the greater prevalence of auctions for these transactions.49
49Our model abstracts from several important issues in the sales of both companies (see note 40) and
houses (in particular, there are ﬂows of buyers and sellers into and out of the housing market so issues of
timing are especially important).
Similarly, the reasons some art dealers argue that auctions can be less proﬁtable than discreetly showing a
signiﬁcant work of art to potential buyers one at a time, negotiating with whoever shows interest, probably
30In takeover battles, however, the set of potential buyers is usually quite limited, and
jump bids are routine, consistent with the evidence that sophisticated value-maximising
sellers usually prefer auctions, while buyers more often prefer to pre-empt them if they can.
With credible jump bidding, unless the number of potential bidders is likely to be large
and the seller has the information and the ability to enforce contracts including lock-ups,
matching rights, and entry subsidies, etc., the auction is more proﬁtable on average except
under delicate conditions on demand curvature, bidding costs, and the supply of potential
bidders; for the seller to prefer the sequential mechanism requires several stars to be aligned
– and for the seller to realize that they are so. If the likely number of potential bidders
is small, or if the seller has only limited information about valuations, entry costs, or the
number of bidders, or needs to standardize procedures across many sales, as with some
government entities, a simultaneous auction is the seller’s best bet: it should structure the
sales process (for example, by timing the release of critical information - see Wasserstein
(2001)) so that bidders are unable or unwilling to make early bids. The preference for
auctions should be particularly strong in the sale of public companies where jump bids can
be made public and where, because of concerns about moral hazard, one might wish to
restrict management in its ability to discriminate between bidders.
Taking a broader perspective, this paper and Bulow and Klemperer (1996) both show
the power of competition. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showed that the extra competition
provided by a single extra bidder dominates the extra value of any clever negotiating strate-
gies or regulatory schemes that might be designed to extract more rents from competing
ﬁrms. The current paper shows that, except in rare cases, potential competition is not a
good substitute for actual competition: the straightforward, level-playing-ﬁeld competition
that a simple auction creates is usually more proﬁtable for a seller than a sequential pro-
cedure that sometimes attract more bidders, but prevents direct, simultaneous competition
among all participants on equal terms.
lie outside our model. The publicity of an auction can create stigma (since sales are often associated with
"the three D’s" - divorce, (ﬁnancial) distress, and death), attract unwelcome attention from tax authorities
(so many private sales take place in Monaco or Liechtenstein), and undermine the common practice of
commissioning a copy of the art sold to hang in its place (after selling the original in a diﬀerent continent).
(There may also be an agency problem: it is hard for a dealer to justify high fees if he merely consigns
clients’ assets to auction.)
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35Appendix A. Examples of the Equilibrium of the Sequential Mechanism
Let bidders’ values be drawn from the uniform distribution F(v)=v for v ∈ [0,1].
Then S(v)=1
6(1 − v)2 (using note 13’s formula), and so (1) =⇒ VS =1−
√
6c.50 That is,
a potential entrant would be just indiﬀerent to entering against an incumbent with a value
in the range [1−
√




the expected proﬁt conditional on doing so will be 1
3
√







6c − c =0 ) .
Let c = .06, so VS = .4. So — starting from any point of the game, and independent of
past history or future {ρj} — a bidder must signal that it has a value of at least .4 to deter
further entry. It can do this by making a bid that, if its value were .4, would give it the
same surplus if it successfully deterred entry as if it did not jump bid and accommodated
further entry.
3-bidder Example
If there are exactly 3 bidders (ρj =1for j ≤ 3, and zero otherwise), a ﬁrst bidder with
t h ed e t e r r i n gv a l u eo f.4 who chose not to deter would win with probability (.4)2,a n de a r n
1
3(.4) conditional on winning, yielding an expected proﬁto f.0213.S o i f t h e ﬁrst bidder’s
value is .4 or more it will jump bid to .4−.0213 = .3787 and there will be no further entry.
If the ﬁrst bidder’s value is less than .4, it will bid v =0 , the second bidder will then
enter, and the two bidders will raise the price continuously until the lower of their two actual
values is reached. Call this price p. If it was the second entrant that quit, the third bidder
then enters (it remains unproﬁtable for the ﬁrst bidder to deter) and if the third bidder’s
value exceeds p, t h ep r i c ec o n t i n u e st or i s eu n t i lt h el o w e ro ft h et w or e m a i n i n gb i d d e r s ’
values is reached.
If, instead, it was the incumbent bidder (that is, the ﬁr s te n t r a n t )t h a tq u i ta tp, the
new incumbent has the opportunity to jump bid to deter the ﬁnal potential entrant. If the
new incumbent had the minimum deterring value, .4, but did not jump bid, its expected
proﬁt from competing with the third bidder would be p(.4−p) (from the case in which the
third value is below p) plus 1
2(.4 − p)2 (from the case in which the third value is between p
and .4) equals .08 − p2/2. So if the second bidder’s value exceeds .4, it makes a jump bid
from p to .32 + p2/2( >p ) immediately after defeating the ﬁrst bidder at the price p,a n d
there is then no further entry. If its value is below .4 it does not jump bid, the third bidder
then enters and, as before, if the third bidder’s value exceeds p the price then rises again
until the lower of the two remaining bidders’ values is reached.
To compute expected revenue, it is easiest to use MRanalysis:51 with probability .43 all
50If c>1/6, only one bidder enters either the sequential mechanism or the auction.
51To compute expected revenue directly, note that with probability .6 the ﬁr s tb i d d e rd e t e r sa tp r i c e.3787.
36three bidders have values between 0 and .4 and so MRs uniformly distributed between -1
and -.2 (since “demand” is linear when values are uniformly distributed). In this case, the
winner will be the highest-value bidder, and have the highest of these three MRsw h i c hi s ,
on average, −.4. With the remaining probability at least one bidder will have a value above
.4, and the ﬁrst of these bidders in the queue will win yielding an expected MRof .4 (using
Fact 2). So total expected revenue equals (.43)(−.4) + (1 − .43)(.4) = .3488. (It is easy to
check that the auction’s expected revenue equals .5).
Alternative Timing of Jump Bidding
As noted in Remark 4, each bidder’s expected surplus would be unaﬀected by the timing
of entrants’ jump-bidding. If, for example, the ﬁrst bidder bid 0, a second bidder with the
minimum deterring value of .4 would expect surplus .4(.4/3) b yn o td e t e r r i n g( i tw o u l dh a v e
the highest signal with probability .4, and would then face two bidders with values uniformly
distributed below .4). So if the second bidder jumps immediately to .4 − .4(.4/3) = .3467,
it will scare oﬀ both the incumbent (the ﬁrst bidder) and the subsequent potential entrant
and obtain the same surplus. (An alternative assumption is that the incumbent would not,
in equilibrium, immediately be scared oﬀ if its value exceeds the jump bid. In this case, the
second bidder jumps to a price of .3425 and is then bid up (to an average of .3713) when
the ﬁrst bidder’s value exceeds .3425, and the third bidder again does not enter.) Expected
revenues are, of course, unaﬀected.
Constant-ρ Example
If instead ρj = ρ ≤ 1 ∀j ≥ 2, a new entrant with the deterring value of v*w h od e f e a t e d
an existing incumbent at price p but chose not to deter would win if no higher-value bidder
entered, and would then pay the maximum of p and the highest among subsequent entrants’
values. The probability that no subsequent entrant’s value would exceed any amount x ≤ v*





, so the probability density of the highest among sub-
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. So the deterring bid of any entrant whose value is v*o rm o r e ,a n dw h od e -
With probability .6(.4) = .24 the second bidder will deter the third bidder after beating the ﬁrst bidder at
price p uniformly distributed between 0 and .4 and the deterring price is .32+p2/2, so the average price in
this case equals
R .4
p=0(.32+p2/2)dp = .3467. With probability .6(.4)2 = .096 neither of the ﬁrst two bidders
will deter and the third bidder’s value is at least .4, so it will win at a price equal to the higher of the ﬁrst two
bidders’ values, which is on average (2/3).4=.2667. Finally, with probability (.4)3 = .064 all three bidders
have values below .4 and the expected price will be the expected second-highest of these three values, that
is, (1/2).4=.2. So total expected revenue equals .6(.3787) + .24(.3467) + .096(.2667) + .064(.2) = .3488.








To calculate expected revenue, we ﬁnd the expected MRof the winning bidder, as for the
3-bidder example above.52 The probability that there exists no bidder with a value above
any x ≤ v*i s1− 1−x
1−ρx. So with probability 1−v*
1−ρv* t h e r ew i l lb eab i d d e rw i t hav a l u eo fa tl e a s t
























ρ2 ln(1 − ρv*).
In the perfect sequential equilibrium, v*= VS =1−
√
6c and, for c = .06,v *= VS = .4
(as in the 3-bidder example above). If, for example, ρ = .8 the expected revenue ≈.29. (It
is not hard to check the auction’s expected revenue ≈.37.)
Appendix B. Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 2: It is straightforward from the discussion in the text that it is a perfect
Nash equilibrium for any entrant, immediately after entry, to jump bid to the price that
deters any future entry, if and only if it has a value ≥ v*, for some v*≥ VS.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
there cannot be a constant deterring “cut-oﬀ”v a l u e>V K, because if two bidders had values
>V K but <v * then a further new entrant would not be deterred and would face a minimum
price >V K. But its expected proﬁts would be less than the proﬁts from facing a ﬁxed price
of VK, which from (2) are zero, which is a contradiction.53 So v* ∈ [VS,V K].
Now consider any sequential equilibrium in which, at some stage, some bidders with
values ≥ VS do not deter; and at that stage let e p be the bid which type VS would be just
indiﬀerent about jumping to if such a jump bid did deter future entry. Then at this stage
of such an equilibrium (i) all types with values ≥ VS would deviate from their equilibrium
strategy to bidding e p if doing so did deter (since types that were anyway deterring would
thereby deter at a lower price, and other types above VS gain more than type VS gains
by deterring and therefore strictly gain) and (ii) no other type would deviate from its
equilibrium strategy to bidding e p even if doing so did successfully deter all further entry. So
a type of bidder with value ≥ VS failing to deter cannot, at any stage, be part of a perfect
sequential equilibrium. The unique perfect sequential equilibrium therefore has v*= VS.54
52As before, it is possible, but more cumbersome, to compute expected revenue directly - see note 51.
53Technically, this argument requires a positive probability of at least three potential entrants existing.
However, any equilibrium in which the “cut-oﬀ value” is above VK in any period not only fails the “intuitive
criterion”, but is not even robust to the “test of dominated messages” (see In-Koo Cho and David Kreps
(1987), and Kreps, 1990, p.436): making the deterring bid corresponding to a “cut-oﬀ value” of VK is strictly
dominated for all types with values below VK (however any potential entrant would respond, all these types
would do better not to jump bid), so making this bid must be interpreted as signalling a value ≥ VK,a n d
will therefore prevent further entry.
54Strictly, if ρj =1∀j this argument proves only that this is the unique neologism-proof equilibrium. It
does not quite prove it is the unique perfect-sequential equilibrium, because a bidder with value below VS is
38P r o o fo fL e m m a3 : In both mechanisms, the direct private and social cost of entering is
the same, that is, c.
In the auction the private and social contribution of each bidder is the same, namely zero
for everyone other than the winner and the diﬀerence between the top two values for the
winner. Since the expected contribution is therefore clearly also decreasing in the number
of entrants, the correct number enter.
In the sequential mechanism, if no bidder with a value of v* or more has yet entered, the
social contribution from one more entry is at least T(v*) ≥ c so entry is socially eﬃcient.
Also, since the entrant will be able to deter entry through a bid no greater than v*, it is
also proﬁtable to enter, even ignoring potential proﬁts from winning with a bid, or even a
value, below v*. If a bidder with a value of v* or more has already entered, it is ineﬃcient
and unproﬁtable for a new bidder to enter even ignoring the possibility of others entering
later: the expected private and social contributions from entry would be S(v*) ≤ c (from
Lemma 2, S(VS)=c and v*≥ VS), so the private and social choices are again identical.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :55 From Remark 4, neither sales process’s expected revenue would be
aﬀected if the actual number of potential entrants, k, were revealed to everyone prior to any
entry decisions. So consider this case.
We ﬁrst demonstrate that with 2 ≤ k ≤ n*, the auction is always strictly more proﬁtable
in expectation:56 if no bidders’ value exceeds v*, the two sales processes yield the same price.
If instead at least one potential bidder prior to the last bidder had a value exceeding v*,
consider the ﬁrst such bidder. The deterring price it sets is such that if its value were v*i t
would be indiﬀerent between deterring at this price, and not deterring. But a bidder with
value v*i sa l s oi n d i ﬀe r e n tb e t w e e nn o td e t e r r i n g ,a n db u y i n gf o rs u r ea tap r i c ee q u a lt ot h e
minimum of v* and the highest among all other past and potential future bidders’ values.
So the deterring price equals the expectation of the minimum of v* and the highest among
all other potential bidders’ values. But the auction would achieve the second highest among
all bidders’ values, which is obviously strictly higher in expectation.
With k>n *, reducing the number of bidders by 1 leaves the auction unaﬀected (since
only n* bidders enter anyway). But reducing the number of bidders by 1 strictly lowers
weakly willing to bid VS if ρj =1∀j, which spoils the exact Grossman-Perry argument (but not Farrell’s).
However, if bidders prefer no bid to a surely-losing one (e.g., there are small bidding costs) or of course if ρj
< 1 for any j, all equilibria other than the constant-cutoﬀ equilibrium with v*= VS fail Grossman-Perry’s
exact reﬁnement, as well as Farrell’s.
55The working paper version of this paper gives a shorter proof using "MRanalysis" following the intuition
given in the main text.
56Note this would be immediate in Myerson (1981)’s "regular case" - which corresponds to assuming
downward sloping MRs - because the auction is then the optimal method of sale to a set of potential
bidders who will all enter.
39the sequential mechanism’s proﬁtability: if any of the ﬁrst k − 2 would deter they would
now do so at a lower price than if a total of k bidders were expected since the deterring
price equals the expectation of the minimum of v* and the highest among all other potential
bidders’ values (as shown in the previous paragraph); clearly, if none of the ﬁrst k−2 would
deter, the price is also strictly lowered in expectation. So for k>n *, the proﬁtability of the
auction minus the proﬁtability of the sequential mechanism is strictly decreasing in k.
Now lowering ρj reduces the probability of exactly k potential bidders for all k ≥ j by
an equal proportion, and increases the probability of k = j − 1.I fj>n *, it is immediate
from the preceding paragraph that transferring probability from k ≥ j to k = j −1 strictly
increases the relative proﬁtability of the auction. If 3 ≤ j ≤ n* ,s i n c e( b yt h ea r g u m e n t
for 2 ≤ k ≤ n*) the auction is strictly more proﬁtable for all the cases 2 ≤ k ≤ j − 1,
it follows that if the auction is at least as proﬁtable for the sequence {ρj}∞
j=1 as a whole,
then a proportional reduction in the "weight" on all the cases k ≥ j must leave the auction
strictly more proﬁt a b l ef o rt h es e q u e n c ea saw h o l e . F i n a l l y ,l o w e r i n gρ2 simply increases
the relative probability of k =1 , where both mechanisms trivially earn the same revenue,
v.
In sum, therefore, if the auction is at least as proﬁtable as the sequential mechanism for
as e q u e n c e{ρj}∞
j=1,t h e nl o w e r i n ga n yρj leaves the auction at least as proﬁtable for j =2 ,
and strictly more proﬁtable for all j>2.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 : The winner of the sequential mechanism is the ﬁrst bidder with a value
exceeding v*. So for v>v * the ratio of the density of the auction-winner’s value to that of
the sequential-mechanism-winner’s value is [nF(·)n−1f(·)]/[
f(·)
1−F(v*)], which is increasing. So
the former density is ﬁrst higher (for v<v *), then lower (it obviously cannot always be
higher), and ﬁnally higher again (it cannot stay lower since the distributions have the same
mean), than the latter density, which implies second-order stochastic dominance.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 : Recall S(v) is the expected surplus of a bidder who competes in an
ascending auction against a second bidder, when their values are drawn independently from
F(·), conditional on the second bidder’s value exceeding v;a n dT(v) is the expected surplus
of the ﬁrst bidder if the second bidder’s value equals v.
Clearly S(v) is decreasing in v,s oi ti sc o n v e xi nv if, ∀ constants a,b,w i t hb<0,
whenever the expression S(v)−(a+bv) changes sign twice, it is ﬁrst positive, then negative,
then positive again.
Furthermore, since S(v)=E{T(w) | w ≥ v},a n dv = E{MR(w) | w ≥ v} (this is Fact
2) and, of course, a = E{a | w ≥ v},w eh a v e
S(v) − (a + bv)=E{[T(w) − a − bMR(w)] | w ≥ v}
40=
R v






in which I[w≥v] is the indicator function.
We know from standard consumer theory that T(v) is convex and decreasing in v,s oi t
is straightforward that if MR(v) is convex in v, then whenever, with b<0, the expression
[T(w) − a − bMR(w)] changes sign twice, it is ﬁrst positive, then negative, then positive
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Proof of Lemma 7:P a r t( i ) :f o rρj =1∀j, assume for contradiction that the sequential
mechanism has as many bidders as the auction in expectation. Then the distribution of
highest values in the sequential mechanism must ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate the
distribution in the auction, since entrants into the sequential mechanism win if and only if
their values are v* or more, while auction participants sometimes lose with values above v*
a n ds o m e t i m e sw i nw i t hv a l u e sb e l o wv*. So since an additional bidder’s expected proﬁts
from entering the sequential mechanism are zero when v*= VS, its expected proﬁts from
entering the auction are positive, which is a contradiction. So the auction attracts more
bidders in expectation.
Now, ∀{ρj}∞
j=1, the auction has a higher probability of a kth bidder entering, for 2 ≤
k ≤ n*( s i n c eakth potential bidder would always participate in the auction and not always
participate in the sequential mechanism, for 2 ≤ k ≤ n*) and the sequential mechanism
obviously has a higher probability of a kth bidder entering, for any k>n *. So since the
auction has more expected bidders for ρj =1∀j, it also has more expected bidders if we
reduce (by lowering ρm) the probability of a kth bidder for all k ≥ m, for any m.
Part (ii) is straightforward.
P r o o fo fL e m m a8 : Recall that entry decisions and expected surplus for all buyers and the
seller would be unaﬀected if the number of potential entrants, k, were revealed in advance
of the ﬁrst bidder’s entrance (Remark 4). So consider the mechanisms with k revealed
in advance. Observe that conditional on actually entering a potential entrant’s expected
surplus from the sequential mechanism is independent of its position in the queue (if its value
is less than v*i tw i n sw h e n e v e ri t sv a l u ee x c e e d sa l lo t h e rk − 1 signals; otherwise it wins
with probability 1, a n dm u s tp a yt h es a m et h a ti tw o u l de x p e c tt op a yi fi t sv a l u ew e r eVs
and it did not deter). Its expected share of surplus from the sequential mechanism therefore
equals the expected fraction of actual entrants that it represents, just as in the auction. So
57This is the variation diminishing property of totally positive kernels developed in Karlin (1968). Jewitt
(1987) gives a concise summary of the theory, and application to economics. We are very grateful to Ian
Jewitt for helping us with this proof.
41because the ﬁrst bidder always enters, and (by Lemma 7) there are fewer expected entrants
in the sequential mechanism than in the auction, the ﬁrst bidder expects a larger share of
the buyers’ surplus in the sequential mechanism than in the auction.
42Figure 1:
Densities of winner’s value for an Auction and Sequential Mechanism with
identical expected winning bid and identical expected winner’s value.
[Drawn for bidders’ values uniformly distributed on [0,1];
for the Auction, n*=3 , so expected winning bid = ·5;
for the Sequential Mechanism we assume the same cutoﬀ (winning) bid, ·5,
so with an inﬁnite number of potential entrants,
the expected winner’s value = ·7 5 ,i nb o t hc a s e s . ]
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